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The U.S.-European Partnership 
Secretary Vance before the Royal Institute for Inter-
national Affairs. 
More than three decades ago the United 
States and the nations of Western Europe 
joined together to rebuild a devastated conti-
nent and to create a military alliance to protect 
freedom. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, those who 
fashioned the Marshall Plan and worked to 
create NATO possessed a vision of a strong 
America and a strong Europe bound by com-
mon interests. From this vision, they created a 
self-renewing partnership that derives con-
tinuing vitality from the values and hopes that 
we share. 
We have passed through a particularly dif-
ficult period during the 1970's. But we have 
navigated these turbulent waters. Although the 
course ahead remains demanding, the progress 
we have made should give us great confidence 
in our future. 
For the first time in its history, all members 
of the NATO alliance are democracies. 
NATO is strong and growing stronger. 
We have not only resisted the worst protec-
tionist pressures in a generation; we are work-
ing together to shape a healthier and more 
open world trading system. 
We have established a pattern of closer con-
sultation on economic and security matters 
than at any point in recent history. 
European integration is proceeding, con-
firming our belief that a strong Europe is good 
for a strong America. 
And we are moving toward more normal 
relations with the nations of Eastern Europe. 
Progress toward this goal has reflected our 
support for full implementation of the Hel-
sinki Final Act and recognition of the 
sovereignty and independence of the nations 
of this area. 
Today, I want to discuss with you how, 
building on this solid foundation, we can con-
tinue to assure our mutual security and foster a 
healthy resurgence of our economies. These 
are the most pressing items on our common 
agenda. 
But even as we concentrate on these vital 
concerns, which have been the constant 
threads of our partnership, our common inter-
ests compel us to address together a broadened 
international agenda. For there are longer 
term challenges to our security and well-being 
that also demand senqus and sustained 
attention: 
• How will the international economic sys-
tem, as well as our own economies, adapt to 
changing patterns of international trade and 
commerce? 
• How can we meet increasing energy 
needs without heightening the risk of nuclear 
proliferation? 
• How can we help meet the legitimate se-
curity needs of nations while seeking agreed 
limitations on the growth of conventional arms 
sales? 
• And how can we find the political will to 
act now on issues which will have a profound 
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impact on the world we leave our children, is-
sues such as population growth and environ-
mental protection? 
These issues will tax our creativity and per-
sistence to the fullest. For we approach all of 
these issues in a changing and pluralistic inter-
national system, with over 150 independent 
nations and emerging new power centers. No 
single nation, or group of nations, can dictate 
solutions to these complex problems. They are 
truly international in their origins and in the 
necessary scope of their solutions. Increasingly, 
our leadership must therefore take the form of 
"i_nspiring other nations to work with us toward 
goals we share and can best achieve in concert. 
And on each of these issues, we look to our 
European allies as a core around which we 
must build these c9_operative efforts. 
Our ability to address this broader agenda 
will depend on the essential vitality of our 
partnership-and specifically on our economic 
and military strength. 
Economic Security for our Peoples 
For most of our countries, the most pressing 
demand today is to revitalize our economies 
and to restore a sense of confidence in our 
economic system. 
Wh{.n the economic history of the last five 
years is written, two important trends will 
stand out. 
The United States and Europe, and indeed 
the industrialized democracies as a whole, have 
experienced the most severe economic prob-
lems of the last quarter century. These in-. 
eluded sharp increases in world oil prices and 
inflation, followed by a serious recession and 
high unemployment. 
Yet despite these serious problems, we have 
been successful in strengthening our economic 
and political cooperation. Instead of sliding 
back into the beggar-thy-neighbor psychology 
that destroyed the global economy in the 
1930's, we have created new and more effec-
tive mechanisms for serious, concerted actions. 
The institution of periodic summit meetings on 
economic matters, closer collaboration among 
monetary authorities, the creation of the In-
ternational Energy Agency and a more active 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development]-all these efforts re-
flect confidence in our capacities, not despair 
in the face of difficulties. 
We are increasing our economic coordina-
tion with one another for a simple reason: be-
cause we all now understand that the economic 
health of each of us is important to the eco-
nomic health of us all. This is especially true in 
times of economic difficulty. Pressures increase 
to protect domestic markets, competition 
sharpens, and we are all tempted to resolve our 
individual problems at the expense of our 
neighbors. But it is precisely then that we must 
be particularly sensitive to the impact our deci-
sions at home will have on others abroad. If we 
make those decisions without sufficient regard 
for the probl~ms of others, we only invite re-
taliation and a spiral of compensating actions. 
All of us will lose ground; all of us will be 
worse off. 
As a result, we all have clearly recognized 
that only through the development of a com-
mon strategy, to which each country contrib-
utes, can we enhance the well-being of every 
nation. 
Cooperating in this way can be difficult and 
frustrating. Domestic political support for 
tough economic decisions often comes slowly in 
democracies. In some cases, results fall short of 
our expectations and we must redouble our ef-
forts. But actions by each of us, together with 
greater transatlantic cooperation, have placed 
the United States and the other industrialized 
nations on the path to sustained, noninflatio-
nary growth. Success will enhance our ability to 
expand individual opportunity and social jus-
tice, which are the greatest strengths of our 
democracies. 
The U.S. Economy 
The United States fully recognizes the im-
portance of a strong and vital American econ-
omy to building greater economic security for 
Europe, Japan, and other nations of the world. 
What we do in Washington can affect the lives 
of citizens of London or Rome, just as the deci-
sions of other governments affect the well-
being of Americans. 
Accordingly, the domestic economic policies 
of the United States are fashioned with a view 
toward the economic interests of the Atlantic 
Community as a whole. Fundamental to this ef-
fort are the commitments made by President 
Carter at the Bonn summit last July. He 
pledged the United States to a major effort to 
reduce inflation and to an energy policy which 
significantly reduces U.S. oil imports. We 
are taking specific actions to fulfill these 
commitments: 
• On October 24, President Carter an-
nounced a broad-based program to fight infla-
tion. It includes monetary restraint, sharp re-
ductions in governmental spending, and 
explicit standards for wage and price increases. 
The President's new budget will put a very 
tight lid on public expenditures and reduce 
our Federal deficit to less than half that of 
1976. 
The President has stressed that controlling 
inflation is our overriding domestic priority. 
We will persist until we have achieved that ob-
jective. 
• On November 1, we undertook further 
far-reaching actions to reinforce the anti-
inflation effort and strengthen the dollar. We 
have tightened monetary conditions signifi-
cantly. The United States also joined with the 
three major surplus countries-Germany, 
Japan, and Switzerland-in coordinating direct 
intervention in the foreign exchange market to 
correct the excessive decline of the dollar. We 
will continue to cooperate in a forceful and 
coordinated way to assure stability in exchange 
markets. To finance its share, the United States 
is mobilizing an unprecedented $30 billion 
which will be used, together with resources of 
the other countries, to intervene massively if 
necessary to achieve our objectives. The United 
States has also expanded its gold sales 
program. 
We expect that with the fundamental im-
provements in the U.S. economic position now 
underway, these actions will exert a continuing 
positive effect on the dollar. 
• On November 9, the President signed 
legislation which lays the basis for a sounder 
U.S. energy policy. This legislation should re-
sult in oil import savings of roughly 2.5 million 
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barrels per day by 1985. We are already im-
proving our energy situation. U.S. energy 
prices have risen significantly closer to world 
levels. And growth in energy consumption is 
now running well below growth in our GNP. 
• We are also working to reduce our 
balance-of-payments deficit through a more 
vigorous export promotion program. 
President Carter is determined to build 
political support for serious actions to deal with 
our economic problems. That support is 
growing. Neither the President, Congress, nor 
the American ·people will be satisfied until we 
show a marked progress in fighting inflation, 
strengthening the dollar, and creating a sound. 
energy economy. 
U.S.-European Economic Cooperation 
While the first task for each of us is to put 
our domestic house in order, we must at the 
same time undertake those joint efforts that 
are needed to sustain our economic growth. 
There is no more immediate or crucial test 
of our ability to join together for our common 
gain than the successful completion this month 
of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. During 
the last three decades, we have worked to-
gether to build a more open and better func-
tioning world trading system. Now we have an 
·opportunity to consolidate the progress we 
have made and further improve the structure 
of our trading relationships. In so doing, we 
can construct for the future a trading envi-
ronment with greater certainty and 
confidence-one which will foster the con-
tinued expansion of world commerce. If we 
succeed, there will be economic gains for us all. 
If we fail, we will jeopardize the economic 
progress we have made. Failure would fuel our 
inflation, slow our growth, and make it more 
difficult for developing nations to play a full 
part in the world trading system. And if we 
fail, we will have also jeopardized the political 
cooperation that w·e have painstakingly 
achieved. 
A major objective of the trade negotiations is 
to provide for an agreed framework to govern 
subsidies and countervailing duties. When our 
Congress convenes next month, the President 
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will seek legislation to extend the authority to 
waive countervailing duties to cover the period 
needed to implement the Tokyo Round 
agreements. And we will take measures to 
minimize the disruptive effects that could flow 
from expiration of the waivers on January 3. 
Our negotiators in Geneva will strive to con-
clude their talks this month. But even as we 
gain ground toward a more open and better 
operating trading system, we must avoid 
piecemeal retreats toward protectionism which 
could undermine that progress. In each coun-
try, various groups will continue to ask gov-
ernments to intervene in the trading system for 
economic, political, and social reasons. Our 
countries have recognized the importance of 
resisting demands which impede effective eco-
nomic adjustment to change. Our response to 
such demands must be within the context of 
the trading framework we have designed to-
gether. Our policies must facilitate positive 
adjustment of our economies to changing eco-
nomic conditions, rather than hindering such 
adjustment or shifting the burden onto others. 
Beyond the immediate need to strengthen 
the world trading system, we all have a basic 
interest in promoting the emerging role of the 
E.uropean Commu"nity in international eco-
nomic affairs. In the United States, we admire 
the vision of men and women who are working 
to broaden and deepen cooperation among the 
nations of Europe. We welcome and support 
this development, for a strong European 
Community is in America's interest as well as in 
the interests of all European nations; it pro-
vides a dynamic new force in international 
economic and political relations. 
The new European monetary arrangements 
for closer monetary cooperation within the 
European Community, announced on De-
cember 5, represent an important step toward 
the economic integration of Europe we have 
long supported. We believe that the new ar-
rangements will be implemented in a way 
which will contribute to sustainable growth in 
the world economy and a stable international 
monetary system. The United States looks for-
ward to continued close consultations with its 
European trading partners as these arrange-
ments evolve. 
In general, the next few years will be critical 
ones for Europe, as the Community works to-
ward closer economic integration, expands its 
membership, holds its first direct elections to 
the European parliament, and assumes a 
growing responsibility for the political and 
ewnomic well-being of Europe as a whole. 
All the Western democracies share in sup-
port and concern for the democracies in 
Southern Europe. We in the United States re-
spect the political commitment of Community 
leaders to open its membership to these states 
and to deal with the economic problems that. 
will come with such a step. 
As prospering Western democracies, we 
should recognize a special responsibility to 
those democracies in the region threatened by 
a faltering economy-where the short-term 
prospects are bleak but where, with a helping 
hand, economies can be put on a sound foot-
ing and the long-term prospects can be bright. 
There are established mechanisms to provide 
needed assistance-the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] and the World Bank. Some 
situations may also call for complementary in-
formal or ad hoc arrangements. The consor-
tium for Portugal is an example. Those na-
tions in a position to help should concert their 
energies and resources. Supportive action be-
fore it is too late is an investment in the future 
of freedom. 
U.S.-European Relations and the Developing 
World 
As we consider means to strengthen the 
economic bonds among the developed coun-
tries, we must recognize that our interests-
and our responsiblities-do not end there. 
Meeting the desire of our citizens for eco~ 
nomic security and a rising standard of living 
requires us to respond more fully to the aspi-
rations of peoples in developing nations. In-
creasingly, their economic well-being is indis-
pensable to our own. 
Together, the world's developing countries 
account for roughly one-third of total trade 
for the OECD nations. These countries pro-
vide the most rapidly expanding markets for 
exports of the industrial world, markets on 
which millions of jobs in our nations depend. 
Developing countries provide us with critical 
raw materials. And we need their cooperation 
to solve such critical global problems as energy 
and food. 
In short, we cannot build a strong interna-
tional economic system without steady eco-
nomic progress by the developing nations. 
Together, we must attempt to push aside 
the ideological debates which often have 
characterized the relationship between the de-
veloping and industrial nations. We must seek 
practical and concrete measures to address the 
basic needs of roughly 800 million people who 
live in absolute poverty. 
There is no more important challenge to 
the world's long-term well-being, to our politi-
cal security, and to our essential values as free 
peoples than working together with the de-
veloping nations to foster their economic 
progress. 
Security Issues 
The cornerstone of our prosperity is the 
confidence we have in our security. This secu-
rity depends essentially on maintaining strong 
military forces, on managing effectively the 
West's relations with the Soviet Union, on 
seeking to limit and reduce arms in both East 
and West, and on the strength of the Atlantic 
partnership. 
We can find cause for concern in the con-
tinuing increases in Soviet military programs 
and deployments. But we can also find cause 
for confidence in the steps we in the alliance 
are taking to preserve the military balance. 
For some years now, the central fact of 
world security has been strategic nuclear par-
ity between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. We and our partners have managed 
this situation without allowing either our de-
terrent or our will to be eroded. 
The fact of strategic parity remains. Just as 
we will match Soviet increases, so we must as-
sume that the Soviets are resolved to match 
us. Thus, the pursuit of superiority by either 
side would result in frustration, waste, in-
creased tension and, in the end, reduced secu-
rity for all. 
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Our common security rests on three un-
derlying principles. 
First, just as we must remain alert and res-
olute about Soviet actions, so we must also be 
ready to explore and expand areas of mutual 
interest. To allow our fears to obscure our 
need to seek common ground is to condemn 
ourselves to unrelenting tension. But neither 
can we let our desire for better relations lead 
us into arrangements that will not adequately 
protect our national interests. 
Second, we must be prepared to do what is 
necessary to assure our security, while prefer-
ring to maintain a balance at lower levels of 
armaments. Both the military and arms con-
trol paths have figured centrally in the history 
of NATO's pursuit of security. 
Arms control is complicated and frustrat-
ing. Our goals and our efforts will inevitably 
be criticized-by some who believe there is too 
little disarmament, and by others who believe 
the Soviets are taking advantage of arms con-
trol agreements. Let us be clear and realistic 
about what we are seeking to accomplish. 
Arms control cannot put an end to military 
competition. But we can-and do-use arms 
control to cap arms buildups, to begin the dif-
ficult process of reductions and qualitative re-
straints, and to sustain a needed dialogue. 
Arms control, correctly understood and 
wisely applied, is yet another way-a com-
plementary way-to pursue security. We 
should not let our inability to accomplish ev-
erything immediately discourage us from sig-
nificant steps we can achieve. 
Third, while the United States will remain 
unsurpassed in military strength, we all must 
remain constantly aware that our security re-
quires collective allied effort, and that our de-
fense is indivisible. As an alliance, we share in 
decisions on security questions, just as we 
share in the burdens and risks of a common 
defense. Western strength, in a military sense 
and also in a larger sense, depends upon the 
health of our partnership and in our self-
confidence about the future. 
These fundamental principles guide our se-
curity decisions. A look at the actual military 
situation and trends, and at how the United 
States and its allies manage the condition of 
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strategic parity, shows that we face great 
challenges, and we are meeting them through 
cooperative action. 
U.S. strategic modernization plans span the 
land, sea, and air components of our forces. 
We are developing a new ICBM, and options 
for new ICBM basing are under intensive re-
view to allow us to choose the best among the 
various alternatives. We will begin deploying a 
new submarine-based missile next year, and 
we are building a new strategic submarine. We 
have a vigorous long-range cruise missile pro-
gram underway, including not only the air-
launched version but sea- and ground-
launched versions as well. These programs 
will insure that the alliance's strength will 
continue to be sufficient to deter attack and 
protect our common interests. 
SALT is another instrument for bolstering 
security. SALT One and the ABM Treaty 
began the important process of limiting 
strategic arms. Without these agreements, we 
would have been launched into a defensive 
arms race on top of an unlimited race in of-
fensive arms. 
SALT Two will be a major brake on the 
momentum of strategic arms competition. 
Facing a more regulated and predictable fu-
ture, we will be able to devote more of our at-
tention, talent, and resources to improving 
conventional and theater nuclear forces for 
NATO. 
SALT Two will establish the principle of 
equality in the number of strategic delivery 
vehicles. And it will put a limit on the number 
of MIRV'd ICBM's, which are potentially most 
harmful to stability. 
At the same time, SALT Two will not rule 
out the force programs we have underway to 
meet the challenges that will remain even with 
an agreement. We have preserved all our 
major strategic force options. Other programs 
that can strengthen deterrence in NATO can 
go forward. Allied interests have been 
protected, because allied interests are our 
interests. 
Let me emphasize that in both our defense 
efforts and our arms control negotiations, our 
basic aim is to strengthen the security of the 
United States and that of our allies. This has 
been and will always be the fundamental 
touchstone of our policy. 
That is why we are involved in SALT-
because a sound agreement will improve 
Western and global security. Without an 
agreement, our technological and economic 
strength would enable us to match any Soviet 
strategic buildup. But a good agreement can 
provide more security with lower risk and 
cost. And we recognize that without SALT the 
strategic competition could infect the entire 
East-West political relationship, damaging the 
effort to create a less dangerous world which 
is at the heart of Western foreign policies. 
The emerging SALT Two agreement will 
not solve all our problems. It will not, for 
example, reverse the trend toward increased 
vulnerability of fixed, land-based missiles, a 
problem in the long run for both sides .. Neces-
sary strategic force modernization must and 
will move forward, just as the SALT process 
must and will move forward. In SALT Three 
we will work for further reductions and qual-
itative limits. 
We cannot discuss the management of 
strategic parity without coming to grips with 
"the issue of how NATO should respond to 
Soviet improvements in their nuclear forces 
targeted against Europe. Though the linkage 
to American strategic forces remain NATO's 
ultimate deterrent, the Soviets must under-
stand that we will not let a weakness develop 
at any point along the continuum of our de-
terrent, including theater nuclear forces. We 
have several theater nuclear modernization 
programs in process. We are exploring 
whether arms control efforts could be of 
benefit. Although no decisions have been 
reached regarding force requirements or 
arms control, we are consulting intensively 
within the alliance to fashion a common plan. 
At the conventional level, improvements in 
Soviet forces continue. Here, too, the West is 
responding effectively. The May 1978 summit 
meeting in Washington agreed to a long-term 
defense program ~esigned to improve the 
ability of NATO to function as a defense co-
alition. NATO is placing top priority on im-
proving conventional forces. In the last few 
years, the United States has increased its 
forces in Europe by roughly 10,000. NATO is 
broadly engaged in a determined effort to in-
crease readiness and capabilities for sustained 
defense. Wisely, we are emphasizing im-
provements which draw upon our collective 
technological strengths, and which will result 
in greater effectiveness rather than simply 
larger forces. Many of these steps are not 
glamorous; they do not attract headlines. But 
they are serious steps taken by a serious al-
liance resolved to muster the resources and 
will to build a better common defense. 
Here, too, we are striving to negotiate re-
straints based on parity; 1978 has brought 
movement by both sides in the five-year-old 
MBFR negotiations. Difficult problems re-
main. But gaining Soviet agreement to reduce 
forces to equal collective levels is worth a 
further sustained effort. Let us hope that the 
achievement of a strategic arms limitations 
agreement can impart a new momentum to 
the MBFR negotiations. 
Of course, Western security concerns and 
interests are wider than NATO. We must also 
ask whether, in an age of strategic parity, we 
are at a disadvantage in competing with the 
Soviet Union in the Third World. The answer 
is no. While Soviet capabilities for projecting 
military power have improved, the United 
States retains not only unequaled naval forces 
and other forms of military power but also 
enjoys economic and political advantages. 
We also welcome the growing spirit of na-
tional independence in the developing na-
tions. They hav·e demonstrated, time and 
again, their determination and ability to avoid 
domination by any outside powers. 
Since 1960, the decolonization process, now 
nearly complete, has produced some 65 new 
nations, with widely differing political, eco-
nomic, and social systems. During these years, 
outside influence has waxed and waned in dif-
ferent countries and at different times. There 
have not been the permanent Communist ad-
vances many once feared. 
This diversity, and the irrepressible thirst 
for national freedom among the Third World 
nations, are the surest barriers to foreign 
domination. We can best promote our own 
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interests in these areas of the world by wel-
coming this diversity and respecting this 
spirit. 
The economic, political, cultural, and secu-
rity ties between the West and the Third 
World have supported this spirit of independ-
ence. We must strengthen those ties-by con-
tinuing to support the economic development 
and, when necessary, the military security of 
these nations through our assistance; by pres-
sing the Soviets and their allies to exercise re-
straint in troubled areas; and by working to 
resolve diplomatically those disputes which 
offer opportunities for foreign interference. 
In the long run, it is the ability of the West 
to offer practical support to Third World 
nationalism, self-determination, and economic 
growth that should make us very confident 
about our future relations. 
Conclusion 
In each of the areas I have addressed today, 
whether economic, political, or military, one 
finds extraordinary challenges ... but, to-
gether, America and Europe have extraordi-
nary resources with which to meet them. 
The physical, industrial, and technological 
resources of our alliance are unequaled. If we 
have the will to develop our economies with 
equity and maintain our defenses with de-
temination, we can achieve a safer and more 
stable world. And we have that will. 
In the end, our alliance is held together not 
simply by what we are against, but by what we 
are for. Our greatest strengths are the ties 
that bind us together. 
These ties are founded on a vision of the 
rights and dignity of the individual, on politi-
cal justice and freedom for all people. 
The negotiations in which we are engaged, 
and the policies we pursue, lack meaning un-
less our foreign policies are in accord with 
these basic values of our peoples. 
Winston Churchill spoke once of the need 
to pull together and "firmly grasp the larger 
hopes of humanity." 
His charge remains, today, our challenge. 
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